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FOURTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY
The Fourth Circuit Summary provides a summary of
prevailing environmental decisions decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit since the last
issue of the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review. It does not cover every environmental decision of the
Fourth Circuit during that time period, but only those cases
which the editors believe to be of the most interest to the
subscribers.
CLEAN AIR ACT/FUGITIVE BENZENE EMISSIONS
United States v. Hoechst Celanese Corporation, No. 96-2003, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29362 (4th Cir. Oct. 27, 1997)
In October, 1997, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a
ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina that held
a local chemical company not liable for violating U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") regulations governing emissions of benzene.
The district court sustained EPA's interpretation of its own regulations, by
which the chemical company was deemed non-exempt from benzene
emission regulations, but concluded that EPA did not provide the company
with "fair notice" of its regulatory interpretation. The appellate court upheld
both the lower court's deference to EPA's interpretation of its own
regulations and the holding that the company initially lacked fair notice of
regulatory interpretation. However, it found that the district court erred in
exonerating the company for violations committed during the period after
EPA had provided the company with specific notice of its interpretations.
The Hoechst Celanese Corporation ("HCC" or "Appellee") runs the
Celriver chemical plant in Rock Hill, South Carolina. From 1987 through
1993, the plant was one of the largest sources in the United States of fugitive
emissions of benzene, a carcinogenic pollutant that poses a significant risk
to human health. The plant uses benzene as a coolant for gases and as a
reflux agent to separate water and other compounds from acetic anhydride
and acetic acid. In 1984, EPA ("Appellant"), by its authority under the Clean
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Air Act, promulgated regulations governing fugitive emissions, or leaks,
from facilities that use, produce, or otherwise have benzene in service. The
National Emission Standard for Equipment Leaks (Fugitive Emission
Sources) of Benzene ("NESHAP") regulates the quantity of benzene that can
be emitted into the air. Plants using benzene are required "to monitor
equipment for leaks, to repair leaks promptly, and to install equipment that
prevents, captures, or destroys benzene emissions." NESHAP also includes
reporting and recordkeeping requirements and provides civil penalties for
violations.
The crux of the litigation between HCC and EPA involved
interpreting exemptions to NESHAP based on amounts of benzene used
annually by a facility. NESHAP exempts from regulation plants "designed
to produce or use less than 1,000 megagrams of benzene per year" (one
megagram equals approximately 2200 pounds). EPA's rationale for this
exemption was that the benefit achieved by regulating small-volume users
was outweighed by the costs. HCC interpreted the term "use" in the EPA
regulation to mean "consumption." Consequently, HCC argued that it was
exempt because its "use" never exceeded 1000 megagrams, due to the fact
that the Celriver Plant continually recycled benzene. Nevertheless, the plant
had a very high volume of fugitive emissions. HCC further concluded that
the exemption was self-executing; therefore, it neither filed reports with EPA
nor complied with monitoring and other NESHAP requirements. In contrast,
EPA defined "use" in much broader terms, to include the recycling of
benzene through pipes and valves, which were capable of leaking. EPA
calculated that the Celriver plant was designed to "use" more than a million
megagrams of benzene annually, and thus HCC was not exempt from
regulation or from penalties for the numerous substantive and paper
violations it committed under NESHAP.
In both its trial and appellate defenses, HCC asserted that EPA's
interpretation of the NESHAP exemption was flawed and did not merit
deference. HCC argued that the plain language of NESHAP did not support
EPA's interpretation and that the agency's interpretation did not deserve
deference because EPA's definition of "use" was a post-hoc concoction
designed to fill the needs of its case against HCC. Alternatively, the
company argued that, even if EPA's interpretation were to be accepted, the
lack of fair notice of EPA's interpretation should prevent the court from
finding HCC liable.
The appeals court relied on well-settled U.S. Supreme Court case law
[Vol. 22:219
FOURTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY
to conclude that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations should be
accorded substantial deference, absent a Constitutional violation, or a finding
of plain error or inconsistency with the regulation. Examining the plain
language of the regulation, the court concluded that EPA's decision to give
the term "use" a broader meaning than HCC did was consistent with the
ordinary meaning of the word, with the statutory goals, and with its usage
within the context of NESHAP. The court reasoned that a regulation written
to reduce the risks of using benzene should apply to recycled, as well as new
benzene, since recycling is just as apt to produce the risk of leakage.
Similarly, the court rejected HCC's contention that EPA employed the term
"use" inconsistently in the regulation itself. The court refuted HCC's
assertion that EPA's application of its definition was post-hoc by examining
EPA's use of the term in the rulemaking record. The court also cited
numerous letters issued by EPA in the summer and fall of 1984, shortly after
NESHAP was promulgated, to companies indicating that "use" did not equate
to "consumption," but rather to the overall quantity of benzene used in the
equipment.
The appellate court was sympathetic to HCC's argument that it had
not received fair notice of EPA's regulatory interpretation before the summer
of 1989. It held that due process required that a party subject to civil,
criminal, or administrative sanctions have fair notice of the law. While the
court recognized EPA's argument that the plain language of a regulation and
its rulemaking record should put parties on notice, it also noted that in this
particular case, nothing in the language of NESHAP or in the rulemaking
record compelled EPA's interpretation of the word "use." Moreover, in
response to EPA's argument that HCC had an obligation to seek further
clarification, the court concluded that HCC had fulfilled this obligation by
consulting, in 1984, with the Texas Air Control Board ("TACB") regarding
one of its plants in Texas that also recycled benzene. Based on a letter from
EPA's Region VI office, responsible for applying NESHAP in Texas, the
TACB interpreted "use" in NESHAP to mean that the overall inventory of
benzene, rather than frequency of recycling, was the determining factor. The
TACB informed HCC that its Texas plant was exempt from NESHAP
regulation because its plant had a total annual inventory of less than 1000
megagrams of benzene. Although apparently cognizant of TACB's letter
to HCC, the EPA Region VI office never contradicted TACB's interpretation.
The appellate court accepted HCC's contention that it should not be punished
for applying the same interpretation to its Celriver facility in South Carolina.
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Finally, with respect to the pre-1989 releases, the court rejected EPA's
argument that HCC's failure to apply for an exemption prevented it from
asserting a right to one. The court found that the exemption appeared self-
executing under the plain language of the regulation.
The Fourth Circuit found HCC's fair-notice-of-interpretation
argument unpersuasive with respect to the post-1989 violations. During that
year, the Celriver plant's fugitive emissions problems came to the attention
of EPA's Region IV office, which is responsible for NESHAP enforcement
in South Carolina. On two occasions during that summer, the Region IV
Office directly and explicitly informed HCC management responsible for the
Celriver plant that the proper interpretation of "use" when benzene is
recycled was calculated on the basis "of total cumulative flow through the
process rather than net benzene consumption or usage." Internal memoranda
of meetings among senior HCC Celriver officials evidenced their
understanding that EPA did not accept the company's interpretation of "use."
According to the lower court record, HCC chose to ignore the admonitions
from EPA's Region IV office and continued to consider the plant exempt
from NESHAP. Based on its finding of actual notice, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the district court's holding that after August, 1989,
the Celriver plant lacked fair notice of agency interpretation of "use" in
NESHAP. It remanded the case to the district court to determine what
penalties should be imposed for the plant's post-1989 violations.
OIL POLLUTION ACT/DAMAGES CAP
National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Trade
Corporation et al., No. 96-1741, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 23648 (4th Cir.
Sept. 9, 1997)
On the night of December 1, 1993, during redocking maneuvers in
Norfolk, Virginia, a tugboat owned by Moran ("Appellee") struck a cargo
vessel and tore open the vessel's fuel tank. Some 9000 gallons of fuel oil
spilled into the Elizabeth River during the time that the cargo vessel moved
upriver and redocked. The U. S. Coast Guard designated the owner of the
cargo vessel, the National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia ("NSCSA" or
"Appellant") as the "responsible party," and NSCSA arranged and paid for
cleanup operations. Its immediate bill for cleanup and damages to affected
parties was almost one million dollars. NSCSA brought a negligence suit
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against Moran in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
to recoup its cleanup and damage costs under the Oil Pollution Act ("OPA"),
the Virginia Water Control Act, and state common law. The Water Control
Act claim was dismissed before trial.
The district court found that Moran's negligence was the sole cause
of the spill and granted relief to NSCSA, but determined that, under section
1004(a)(2) of OPA, Moran's damages were capped at $500,000 and that
NSCSA could not circumvent the OPA cap by claiming damages under state
law. At the same time, NSCSA was awarded almost $20,000 for lost fuel and
damage to the cargo vessel's hull. NSCSA appealed from the court's denial
of its claim for total relief and from the finding that none of the exceptions
to OPA's damages cap applied. Moran cross-appealed the district court's
finding of negligence.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed Moran's cross-
appeal. OPA defines the responsible party for a spill as the owner or operator
of the vessel that actually discharges the oil. However, the responsible party
can pass on liability to a third party if it can prove that the discharge and the
resulting removal costs and damages were caused solely by an act or
omission of the third party. Upon review, the appellate court found that the
lower court did not clearly err in assigning sole negligence to Moran.
Section 1004(a)(2) of OPA provides a damages cap for third party
vessels other than tank vessels involved in oil spills. The cap is "$600 per
gross ton or $500,000, whichever is greater." Moran's tugboat weighed only
252 gross tons; therefore, the district court limited Moran's liability to
$500,000. NSCSA attempted to circumvent this cap by arguing for an
exception under section 1002(c) of OPA, and by bringing additional claims
under the Virginia Water Control Act and state common law.
In making its exception argument, NSCSA relied on that portion of
section 1004(c) that renders the OPA damages cap inapplicable if the third
party vessel violates a pertinent federal safety regulation. The appellant
contended that Moran, through its agent-pilot, violated that portion of the
Inland Navigational Rule that requires a vessel to maintain a proper lookout
by sight and by hearing, according to prevailing circumstances, in order to
minimize the risk of collision. Because on the night of the accident the
tugboat pilot was acting as his own lookout, NSCSA argued that the Inland
Navigational Rule had been violated. The appellate court reviewed the lower
court's findings of fact for clear error and concluded that, under the
prevailing weather and light conditions, an additional lookout would not have
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made a difference.
Attempting to recover its costs under state law, NSCSA cited the
Virginia Water Control Act's provision that any person responsible for
causing a discharge of oil into state waters is liable for the resulting damage
to real and personal property and for loss of income. The NSCSA interpreted
the language to allow it to recover its response costs under OPA as property
damage or economic losses. NSCSA also relied on Virginia common law
indemnity and subrogation claims to obtain reimbursement for its OPA
expenses. The court, however, concluded that NSCSA could not use state
law claims to collect damages in excess of the OPA cap.
Finally, NSCSA cited section 1018(a)(2) of OPA, which states that
the Act does not affect or modify the obligations or liabilities of any person
under state law, including common law. In rejecting NSCSA's argument, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the appellant was reading section
1018(a)(2) too broadly. The section "only protects the rights of parties to
bring additional claims based on liability that accrues under state law." It
does not allow a claimant to use state law to collect costs it incurred as a
result of claims brought under OPA. In this case, NSCSA had been sued
under OPA. State law was not imposed to force NSCSA to clean up the spill
or to compensate victims. By the same rationale, NSCSA was not precluded
by OPA from bringing a general maritime claim against Moran for loss of
fuel and damage to its ship's hull.
The Fourth Circuit concluded by explaining that the congressional
intent of the OPA damages cap was to limit liability for smaller vessels
involved in oil spills. It noted that the cap would be rendered meaningless if
a claimant were allowed to recoup its OPA liability costs in excess of the cap
through state law claims.
RCRA/CONSENT DECREE
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, No. 97-1756, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 16961 (4th Cir.
Jul. 8, 1997)
The Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation ("WPSC" or "Appellant")
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA" or "Appellee")
entered into a consent decree in October, 1989, after litigation over the
closure of a surface impoundment at WPSC's coke manufacturing plant in
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Follansbee, West Virginia. The dispute centered on whether the closure had
occurred prior to the effective date of EPA regulations governing the closure
of surface impoundments that were promulgated pursuant to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). The consent decree established
WPSC's obligations for closing the impoundment and taking steps to contain
hazardous wastes. The decree represented a comprehensive settlement of
claims and counterclaims between the parties.
The consent decree mandated informal dispute resolution prior to the
parties seeking administrative or judicial action arising from disputes over the
meaning or implementation of the terms of the decree. If negotiations failed,
EPA's position would control unless WPSC filed with the court a petition
describing the nature of the dispute, along with a proposed resolution. WPSC
would have to prove that EPA's position was arbitrary and capricious. The
consent decree also stated that the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia would retain jurisdiction for dispute resolution
under the consent decree.
After the consent decree took effect, EPA discovered significant
groundwater contamination at the Follansbee plant. At the time, EPA was
uncertain whether the source of the contamination came from the surface
impoundment or from other areas of the plant. On September 27, 1996, EPA
issued an Initial Administrative Order ("IAO") under RCRA requiring WPSC
to take corrective measures relating to both the surface impoundment and to
areas of the plant unrelated to the surface impoundment. WPSC objected to
the order as a violation of the terms of the consent decree. Additionally, it
alleged that the IAO was invalid, based on a theory of res judicata and on
statutory grounds that the IAO exceeded EPA's authority under RCRA.
WPSC petitioned the district court for dispute resolution, as provided in the
consent decree. EPA responded by amending the IAO to require WPSC to
take corrective measures at the plant only in areas not related to the surface
compound. The agency then moved to dismiss WPSC's petition. The district
court found in favor of EPA, dismissing the petition for dispute resolution
and finding itself without jurisdiction to consider invalidating the IAO on
WPSC's other legal theories.
Responding to WPSC's appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the district court was correct in finding that the amended IAO did
not violate the terms of the consent decree. The court found nothing in the
consent decree that precluded EPA from requiring corrective measures
unrelated to the surface impoundment. The appellate court also reminded
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WPSC that, unless it proved that EPA's interpretation was arbitrary and
capricious, EPA's position would control where there was a lack of
consensus between the parties as to the meaning or implementation of the
consent decree. In the court's view, EPA's interpretation was "reasonable
enough so as not to be arbitrary and capricious."
The Fourth Circuit also upheld the lower court's finding that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider WPSC's claims against the IAO based on principles
of res judicata and EPA's lack of statutory authority. The jurisdiction
conferred on the district court by the consent decree was limited to the
enforcement and interpretation of the provisions of the consent decree.
Under the consent decree, the lower court could consider WPSC's argument
that the amended IAO violated the decree, but it was not empowered by the
decree to consider challenges to the amended IAO arising either under
common law or statute.
In deciding whether the district court might have a basis for reviewing
the amended IAO independent of the provisions of the consent decree, the
appeals court relied on the principles of exhaustion and ripeness found in
section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). The court
concluded that, in the absence of a statutory provision for judicial review, the
lower court was prevented by section 704 of the APA from reviewing
WPSC's claim unless the amended IAO constituted final agency action.
Both WPSC and EPA conceded that the amended IAO was not a final agency
action and WPSC could identify no independent statutory provision allowing
for judicial review. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit found that appellant had
not exhausted the administrative remedies available to it under EPA
regulations and that its claim was therefore not ripe for judicial review.
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